The Sources of Scepticism

It is claimed that the radical sceptical problem that is the focus of much of contemporary epistemological discussion in fact divides into two logically distinct sub-problems—a formulation that turns on the closure principle and a second formulation which turns on the underdetermination principle. T...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. VerfasserIn: Pritchard, Duncan 1974- (VerfasserIn)
Medienart: Elektronisch Aufsatz
Sprache:Englisch
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Veröffentlicht: 2016
In: International journal for the study of skepticism
Jahr: 2016, Band: 6, Heft: 2/3, Seiten: 203-227
normierte Schlagwort(-folgen):B Erkenntnistheorie / Disjunktion (Logik) / Logischer Schluss / Skeptizismus
weitere Schlagwörter:B Belief closure epistemological disjunctivism hinge commitments knowledge perception scepticism underdetermination Wittgenstein
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Zusammenfassung:It is claimed that the radical sceptical problem that is the focus of much of contemporary epistemological discussion in fact divides into two logically distinct sub-problems—a formulation that turns on the closure principle and a second formulation which turns on the underdetermination principle. The Wittgensteinian account of the structure of rational evaluation is set out, and it is shown how this proposal—at least when properly formulated—can deal with closure-based radical scepticism. It is also claimed, however, that this account fails to gain any purchase on underdetermination-based radical scepticism. The antidote to this latter form of radical scepticism lies elsewhere—with, it is suggested, epistemological disjunctivism.
Physische Details:Online-Ressource
ISSN:2210-5700
Enthält:In: International journal for the study of skepticism
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/22105700-00603008