Most Peers Don't Believe It, Hence It Is Probably False
Rob Lovering has recently argued that since theists have been unable, by means of philosophical arguments, to convince 85 percent of professional philosophers that God exists, at least one of their defining beliefs must be either false or meaningless. This paper is a critical examination of his argu...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Collaborateurs: | |
| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publié: |
[2017]
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| Dans: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 2017, Volume: 9, Numéro: 4, Pages: 87-112 |
| Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Lovering, Rob
/ Théisme
/ Preuve de l’existence de Dieu
/ Critique
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophie de la religion NBC Dieu |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
peer disagreement
B arguments for God's existence B Lovering |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Résumé: | Rob Lovering has recently argued that since theists have been unable, by means of philosophical arguments, to convince 85 percent of professional philosophers that God exists, at least one of their defining beliefs must be either false or meaningless. This paper is a critical examination of his argument. First we present Lovering's argument and point out its salient features. Next we explain why the argument's conclusion is entirely acceptable for theists, even if, as we show, there are multiple problems with the premises. |
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| Contient: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v9i4.1987 |