Epistemic Angst, Intellectual Courage and Radical Scepticism
The overarching aim of this paper is to persuade the reader that radical scepticism is driven less by independently plausible arguments and more by a fear of epistemic limitation which can be overcome. By developing the Kierkegaardian insight that knowledge requires courage, I show that we are not,...
1. VerfasserIn: | |
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Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Veröffentlicht: |
[2019]
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In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Jahr: 2019, Band: 9, Heft: 3, Seiten: 206-222 |
normierte Schlagwort(-folgen): | B
Pritchard, Duncan 1974-, Epistemic angst
/ Wissenserwerb
/ Skeptizismus
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RelBib Classification: | AB Religionsphilosophie; Religionskritik; Atheismus VA Philosophie |
weitere Schlagwörter: | B
intellectual courage
B Kierkegaard B Reasons Identity Thesis B epistemic angst B Cartesian picture B radical skepticism |
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Vermutlich kostenfreier Zugang Volltext (Resolving-System) Volltext (doi) |
Zusammenfassung: | The overarching aim of this paper is to persuade the reader that radical scepticism is driven less by independently plausible arguments and more by a fear of epistemic limitation which can be overcome. By developing the Kierkegaardian insight that knowledge requires courage, I show that we are not, as potential knowers, just passive recipients of a passing show of putatively veridical information, we also actively need to put ourselves in the way of it by learning to resist certain forms of epistemic temptation: the Cartesian thought that we could be ‘imprisoned' within our own representations, and, hence permanently ‘out of touch' with an ‘external' world, and the Reasons Identity Thesis, which has us believe that whether we are in the good case or in the bad case, our epistemic grounds are the same. |
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ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
Enthält: | Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20191388 |