Epistemic Angst, Intellectual Courage and Radical Scepticism

The overarching aim of this paper is to persuade the reader that radical scepticism is driven less by independently plausible arguments and more by a fear of epistemic limitation which can be overcome. By developing the Kierkegaardian insight that knowledge requires courage, I show that we are not,...

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1. VerfasserIn: Schönbaumsfeld, Genia 1973- (VerfasserIn)
Medienart: Elektronisch Aufsatz
Sprache:Englisch
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Veröffentlicht: [2019]
In: International journal for the study of skepticism
Jahr: 2019, Band: 9, Heft: 3, Seiten: 206-222
normierte Schlagwort(-folgen):B Pritchard, Duncan 1974-, Epistemic angst / Wissenserwerb / Skeptizismus
RelBib Classification:AB Religionsphilosophie; Religionskritik; Atheismus
VA Philosophie
weitere Schlagwörter:B intellectual courage
B Kierkegaard
B Reasons Identity Thesis
B epistemic angst
B Cartesian picture
B radical skepticism
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Zusammenfassung:The overarching aim of this paper is to persuade the reader that radical scepticism is driven less by independently plausible arguments and more by a fear of epistemic limitation which can be overcome. By developing the Kierkegaardian insight that knowledge requires courage, I show that we are not, as potential knowers, just passive recipients of a passing show of putatively veridical information, we also actively need to put ourselves in the way of it by learning to resist certain forms of epistemic temptation: the Cartesian thought that we could be ‘imprisoned' within our own representations, and, hence permanently ‘out of touch' with an ‘external' world, and the Reasons Identity Thesis, which has us believe that whether we are in the good case or in the bad case, our epistemic grounds are the same.
ISSN:2210-5700
Enthält:Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20191388