Epistemic Angst, Intellectual Courage and Radical Scepticism
The overarching aim of this paper is to persuade the reader that radical scepticism is driven less by independently plausible arguments and more by a fear of epistemic limitation which can be overcome. By developing the Kierkegaardian insight that knowledge requires courage, I show that we are not,...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publié: |
[2019]
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| Dans: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Année: 2019, Volume: 9, Numéro: 3, Pages: 206-222 |
| Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Pritchard, Duncan 1974-, Epistemic angst
/ Acquisition des connaissances
/ Scepticisme
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophie de la religion VA Philosophie |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
intellectual courage
B Kierkegaard B Reasons Identity Thesis B epistemic angst B Cartesian picture B radical skepticism |
| Accès en ligne: |
Accès probablement gratuit Volltext (Resolving-System) Volltext (doi) |
| Résumé: | The overarching aim of this paper is to persuade the reader that radical scepticism is driven less by independently plausible arguments and more by a fear of epistemic limitation which can be overcome. By developing the Kierkegaardian insight that knowledge requires courage, I show that we are not, as potential knowers, just passive recipients of a passing show of putatively veridical information, we also actively need to put ourselves in the way of it by learning to resist certain forms of epistemic temptation: the Cartesian thought that we could be ‘imprisoned' within our own representations, and, hence permanently ‘out of touch' with an ‘external' world, and the Reasons Identity Thesis, which has us believe that whether we are in the good case or in the bad case, our epistemic grounds are the same. |
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| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20191388 |