Retributive karma and the problem of blaming the victim
A defining feature of retributive conceptions of karma is their regarding of suffering or misfortune as consequent upon sins committed in previous lives. Some critical non-believers in karma take offence at this view, considering it to involve unjustly blaming the victim. Defenders of the view demur...
Auteur principal: | |
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Type de support: | Électronique Article |
Langue: | Anglais |
Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
Publié: |
2013
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Dans: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 2013, Volume: 74, Numéro: 2, Pages: 149-165 |
Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Buddhism
B Arvind Sharma B Reincarnation B Hinduism B Ludwig Wittgenstein B Blaming the victim B Karma |
Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Édition parallèle: | Non-électronique
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Résumé: | A defining feature of retributive conceptions of karma is their regarding of suffering or misfortune as consequent upon sins committed in previous lives. Some critical non-believers in karma take offence at this view, considering it to involve unjustly blaming the victim. Defenders of the view demur, and argue that a belief in retributive karma in fact provides a motivation for benevolent action. This article elucidates the debate, showing that its depth is such that it is best characterized as a disagreement in form of life (in Wittgenstein’s sense) rather than as a disagreement in opinions. Also briefly discussed is an example of a non-retributive form that belief in karma and reincarnation can take. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
Contient: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-012-9376-z |